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Seton Hall Law

The Injury in Receiving a Text Message
Introduction
This year, the Ninth Circuit held a single unsolicited call to a woman’s cellphone created
enough harm for her to file suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).1 The
TCPA, codified in 1991, was initially enacted to combat companies sending advertisements to
potential consumers through their personal facsimile (“fax”) machines.2 Since then, technology
has advanced, and while the use of fax advertisements has declined, companies have looked to
emerging technologies to reach customers. Text messages are an appealing medium, with six
billion text messages sent daily in 2011, and the average person sending or receiving thirty-five
messages every day.3
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo v. Robins, a case analyzing the injury requirement
for a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970. 4 Since the decision, lower federal
courts have used the decision to analyze other consumer litigation claims.5 Spokeo holds, “a
plaintiff’s injury must be both ‘particularized’ and ‘concrete’ in order to have standing to sue.”6
The issue being addressed in recent TCPA litigation is if the harms being alleged under the
Act are “concrete and particularized.” This has been difficult for modern courts as they have
attempted to address claims that did not exist when the TCPA was enacted in 1991. The unresolved
question presents problems for both businesses and consumers, as businesses attempt to market to

1

Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2017).
Spencer W. Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991:
Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology, 26 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 343, 355 (quoting S. Rep. No.
102-178, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1968, 1970 (1991)).
3
Marissa A. Potts, “Hello, it’s me [Please don’t sue me!]: Examining the FCC’s Overbroad Calling Regulations
under the TCPA, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 281, 283 (2016).
4
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542 (2016).
5
See, e.g. Vann Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, L.L.C., 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017).
6
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
2
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consumers through the inexpensive and convenient methods available through modern
telecommunication technology, and consumers attempt to preserve their right to privacy.
Both the Third and the Ninth Circuits have addressed TCPA claims and found unwanted
messages from businesses to constitute as “particularized” and “concrete” harms under Spokeo.7
This consumer friendly approach has been the trend of the circuit courts; however, the Fourth
Circuit has taken a defendant friendly position in its analysis for the harm requirement when
applying the Spokeo test.8
Interpretation of the TCPA by the courts under the Spokeo framework has construed the
receiving of an unsolicited text message as an injury to a plaintiff. 9 While this coincides with the
legislative intent of the TCPA, it ignores the realities of the shift in how technology affects
consumers. This note will discuss the emerging inquiry on what should constitute a litigious injury
for TCPA claims following Spokeo.
Section I will discuss the TCPA, explaining its intended purpose. Section II will explain the
Spokeo case and discuss why the holding had an impact on the analysis of TCPA claims. Section
III will discuss how plaintiffs bring TCPA claims, and specifically, what the injury requirements
are for successful TCPA claims. Section IV will analyze the circuit court decisions for consumer
protection claims following the Spokeo ruling. Section V will look at how the TCPA interpretation
has changed as technology has advanced, and Section VI will apply the current legal framework
to the question of if a text message should constitute a concrete injury under the TCPA.

7

Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041; Susinno, 862 F.3d at 352.
Dreher v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 856 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2017).
9
Amanda Bronstad, Latest TCPA Decision Eases Path for Consumers, Deepens Circuit Split, 223 N.J. L. J. 1, 1.
8
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I.

Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Prior to the TCPA, Congress had not addressed the new technologies that emerged at the

end of the twentieth century in the telecommunications industry, leaving them unregulated and
prone to abuse by unsolicited advertisers.10 One prominent marketing medium was the fax
machine. Advertisers would gain access to consumers’ numbers, then send promotions, often
unsolicited, through consumers’ fax machines.11 This practice was inexpensive for companies as
it placed the financial burden on consumers, whose ink and toner would be used to print the
advertisements.12 Consumers also faced blocked phone lines and general annoyance as they had
no control in receiving these advertisements.13
States attempted to regulate these burdensome practices, but interstate telecommunication
structures made the regulations ineffective.14 In response to state demand for interstate regulation,
the 1991 Telephone Consumer Protection Act was enacted, with the purpose of “imposing
restrictions on the use of telephones for unsolicited advertising by telephone and fax.”15 The TCPA
was a response to the issue presented by modern telecommunication technology increasing access
to consumers.16 Unlike other advertising regulations that focus on regulating an advertisement’s
content, the TCPA focuses on regulating the medium of advertisement conveyance.17
The TCPA protects consumers from unsolicited advertisements; defined as “any material
advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services, which is transmitted

10

Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 347.
Id. at 354.
12
Id.
13
Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right balance in the Private Enforcement
of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 90 NEB. L. REV. 70, 79.
14
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 347.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 350.
17
Id.
11

M. Beirne

3

to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.”18 This definition
excludes “(A) . . . any person with that person’s prior express invitation or permission, (B) . . . any
person with whom the caller has an established business relationship, or (C) . . . a tax exempt
nonprofit organization[s].”19
TCPA claims are most commonly enforced by private actions.20 The Act allows plaintiffs
to bring: (1) an action to recover for a monetary loss from a violation, or (2) an action to recover
$500 in damages for each such violation, or (3) both.21 In addition, the court has the discretion to
award punitive damages to the plaintiff of up to three times the amount recoverable for
compensatory damages if it finds the defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated the TCPA.22
Though the most common method of enforcement, private actions are limited in “incentivizing
lawsuits against, and deterring the actions of, intentional violators” of the Act.23
State governments have the authority to bring civil law suits under the TCPA when a
company has shown a “pattern or practice of violations.”24 State governments have not used this
power often, instead relying on private actions to enforce the TCPA.25 Because TCPA injuries are
not physically harmful or dangerous, state governments do not prioritize enforcement.26
The TCPA also permits administrative action against violators.27

The Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) is the agency responsible for administrative
enforcement.28 The FCC has a form available on its website for consumers to report TCPA

18

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2017).
Id. at § 227(a)(4) (2017).
20
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 348.
21
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(C).
22
Id. at § 227(b)-(c).
23
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 348.
24
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(2011).
25
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 375.
26
Id.
27
Linetsky, supra note 13 at 79.
28
Id.
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violations.29 Under the Act, “[a]ny person that is determined by the Commission . . . to have
violated [the TCPA] shall be liable to the United States.”30 The FCC is also responsible for
prescribing regulations to implement the statute.31 While the FCC has broad authority to enforce
and interpret the statute, it is limited by slow processing, leaving a majority of TCPA enforcement
in the hands of private litigants.32
The TCPA has been applied to modern technologies that emerged after its enactment in 1991.33
The FCC interprets the phrase, “to call,” as “communicat[ing] with a person by telephone.”34
Under this interpretation, the Act applies to both voice calls and text messages.35 This is consistent
with the intended purpose of protecting consumer privacy, as “a voice or text message [is] not
distinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy.”36
II.

Spokeo v. Robins

In 2016, a claim filed under the Fair Credit Reporting Act made its way to the Supreme Court.37
The defendant operated a company that provided information about people.38 The controversy
arose when the company gave incorrect information about the plaintiff to a third party.39 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the sufficiency of the injury claimed by the
plaintiff.40 The Court held that “a plaintiff’s injury must be both ‘particularized’ and ‘concrete,’
and courts considering the issue must distinguish between those characteristics in their standing

29

Id. at 80.
47 U.S.C. § 227 (e)(5)(A)(i).
31
Id.
32
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra, note 2 at 348.
33
Id. at 366.
34
Id. at 367.
35
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041 (citing In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115).
36
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
37
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
30
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analysis.”41 The Court based its holding on the Constitution, finding “a plaintiff ‘cannot allege a
bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.’”42
III.

Jurisdiction for TCPA Claims
a. Article III Standing
For a court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present a claim with standing.43 Standing

is the “right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”44 Article III of
the Constitution addresses federal court standing, requiring a case or controversy for a federal court
to have jurisdiction.45 Article III has three requirements for the case or controversy requirements:
(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) that was caused by the defendant, and (3) that is redressable.46 An injuryin-fact is defined as “[a]n actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, in contrast to
an invasion that is conjectural or hypothetical.”47 If the defendant caused an injury-in-fact, and
the injury is redressable, a federal court has Article III standing to hear and decide the case.48
In addition to Article III standing, federal courts also require prudential standing.49 This
doctrine specifies that “prudential rules should govern the determination [of] whether a party
should be granted standing to sue . . . [t]he most important rule [being] that a plaintiff who asserts
an injury must come within the ‘zone of interest’ arguably protected by the Constitution or a

41

Id. at 1545.
U.S. CONST. art. III, 2. See also, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544 at 1549.
43
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
44
Priya Khangura, Hurdles to the court: The Doctrine of Standing Under Statutory Violations, 11 DUKE J. CONST.
LAW & PP SIDEBAR 41, 41 (2016) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
45
Id.
46
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
47
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016).
48
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49
Khangura, supra note 44.
42
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statute.”50 Under the prudential-standing doctrine, a case with Article III standing may lack federal
jurisdiction if there is no prudential standing.51 This requirement was enacted to limit the role of
courts in areas of public dispute.52
The prudential standing doctrine has two exceptions: (1) the existence of “countervailing
circumstances,” or (2) if Congress grants “an express right of action to persons who otherwise
would be barred.”53 These exceptions do not apply to the Article III standing requirements.54
Federal courts require an injury-in-fact to establish jurisdiction, regardless of whether Congress
granted a right of action by statute.55
b. Harm Requirement
In recent TCPA cases, circuit courts have used the “concrete” and “particularized” analysis
from Spokeo when conducting the standing analysis.56 Spokeo holds that to satisfy the injury-infact requirement under Article III for consumer litigation claims, the plaintiff must show an injury
is “concrete and particularized.”57 An injury is concrete when it is de facto, meaning that it actually
exists and is not abstract.58 A concrete injury does not have to cause a tangible harm.59 For many
consumer litigation claims, the harm alleged is intangible. While this does not bar an establishment
of concreteness, a court must determine if an actual harm has been alleged. An injury is

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (Bryan A. Garner ed., Thomson Reuters 5th Pocket ed. 2016).
Id.
52
Khangura, supra note 44 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
53
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
54
Id. at 51.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g. Susinno, 862 F.3d at 346.
57
Spokeo, 136 U.S. at 1548 (emphasis added).
58
Id. at 1547-48.
59
Id.
50
51
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particularized when it “affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” 60 To determine the
sufficiency of an alleged injury, courts follow the two step inquiry from Spokeo.61
The first step to determine sufficiency of an injury is to define the protected legal interest.62
This can be done by looking to the language and legislative history of the statute. 63 Though
statutory intent indicates a likelihood of a recognizable harm, the Spokeo decision affirmed a
statute granting a right to file a claim does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact
requirement.”64
If the court finds a protected legal interest, the court then proceeds to step two; determine
if the harm violates a legally protected interest.65 Justice Alito explained in Spokeo that, because
the analysis is based on historical practices, “it [can be] instructive to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing
a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”66 A legally protected interest can also be
inferred by looking to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.67
IV.

Circuit Court Cases Following Spokeo v. Robins
a. 9th Circuit
i. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness
A 2017 case that applied the Spokeo analysis to a TCPA claim was Van Patten v. Vertical

Fitness.68 The plaintiff filed suit after receiving a series of promotional texts from Vertical

60

Id. at 1549.
Michael G. McLellan, Finding a Leg to Stand on: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and Statutory Standing in Consumer
Litigation, 31 Antitrust 49, 50 (2017).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
65
McLellan, supra note 61 at 49.
66
136 S. Ct. at 1549.
67
McLellan, supra 61 at 49.
68
847 F.3d at 1041.
61
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Fitness.69 Vertical Fitness was the company that took over a gym the plaintiff had previously been
a member of.70 Though the plaintiff had only been a member of that gym for three days, the
plaintiff provided his personal information, including his phone number, when submitting an
application.71 Three years after leaving the gym, Vertical Fitness, which had obtained his number
during their acquisition of the gym, sent the plaintiff promotional text messages.72
In response to the text messages sent by Vertical Fitness, the plaintiff filed a putative class
action under the TCPA.73 His claim alleged Vertical Fitness had “caus[ed] consumers actual
harm” with “the aggravation that necessarily accompanies wireless spam” along with having to
“pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such wireless spam.”74
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s standing, it used the standard held in
Spokeo.75 In determining if there had been a concrete harm, the court, looked to historically
recognized cognizable harms in English and American courts.76 When Congress enacted the
TCPA, it found that “‘unrestricted telemarketing can be an intrusive invasion of privacy’ and is a
‘nuisance.’”77 In traditional English and American law, invasion of privacy and nuisance have
been considered substantial harms, warranting judicial relief.78 The Ninth Circuit found that
unsolicited calls and texts by their nature invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of recipients.79
Because the harm addressed by the TCPA had historically been recognized, the Ninth Circuit held

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041.
75
Id.
76
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540.
77
Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043.
78
Id.
79
Id.
70
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the text messages were a concrete and particularized harm that entitled the plaintiff to both Article
III and prudential standing.80
b. 3rd Circuit
i. Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc.
In Sussino, The Third Circuit considered the harm requirement for a TCPA claim.81 The
plaintiff in the case received a single unsolicited call to her cellphone from Work Out World, Inc.
(“WOW”).82 The harm alleged by the plaintiff derived from a one minute prerecorded promotional
message left on the plaintiff’s voicemail by WOW.83 In its defense, WOW asserted that “the
structure of [the TCPA provision] limits the scope of ‘cellular telephone services’ to when ‘the
called party is charged for the call.’”84 WOW cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that
suggests “‘two or three’ calls would not be ‘highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person]’
which would create no injury-in-fact for the plaintiff to assert.”85
The issue presented was whether the TCPA prohibited the defendant’s conduct, and if so,
if the harm was sufficiently concrete and particularized to have Article III and prudential
standing.86 After concluding the TCPA did apply, the Third Circuit analyzed the sufficiency of
the plaintiff’s standing under the Spokeo framework.87

The court interpreted Spokeo as a

“reiteration [of] traditional notions of standing,” specifically noting the traditional principle that
the mere technical violation of a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself,
constitute an injury-in-fact. 88

80

Id.
862 F.3d. at 348.
82
Id. at 352.
83
Id. at 348.
84
Id. at 349
85
Id. at 351-52.
86
Id. at 348.
87
Susinno, 862 F.3d. at 350.
88
Id. at 350, 52.
81
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In applying the Spokeo standard, the court looked to whether there was a Congressionally
defined injury.89 The TCPA applies “directly to single recorded calls from cell phones,” and in
enacting the statute, Congress focused on protecting consumers’ privacy interests.90 In her
complaint, the plaintiff alleged harm in the form of a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.”91 The
court concluded the claim was the kind Congress intended to address in enacting the TCPA.92
Under Spokeo, it is not enough to assert a Congressionally identified harm to satisfy
standing; the harm must also be concrete and particularized.93 To determine if the harm was
concrete, the Third Circuit looked to historical tradition to determine if the harm was recognized
by English and American courts.94 In conducting this historical analysis, the court must find
“newly established causes of action protect essentially the same interests that traditional causes of
action sought to protect.”95 Looking at the alleged harm, the Third Circuit found TCPA claims,
alleging an “invasion[] of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance,” are those that have
historically been heard in American courts.96
The Third Circuit conceded that, if the claim had been brought prior to the enactment of
the TCPA, the alleged injury would not have been a concrete harm sufficient for establishing
Article III standing. But, by enacting the statute, Congress had “elevat[ed] a harm that, while
previously inadequate in the law,’ was of the same character of previously existing ‘legally
cognizable injuries.’”97 Because Congress elevated the injury instead of creating a new kind of

89

Id. at 351.
Id. at 351 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C)).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1540.
94
Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351.
95
Id.
96
Id. (quoting Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043).
97
Id. at 352.
90

M. Beirne

11

injury, the court determined the harm was sufficient to establish Article III standing.98 Under this
interpretation, the Third Circuit found a single one-minute voicemail was sufficient to confer
standing before a federal court.99
ii. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig.
In the Third Circuit case, In re Horizon, the court analyzed the harm requirement for
consumer litigation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”.)100 The defendant, Horizon,
owned laptops that contained the plaintiffs’ personal information.101 When those laptops were
stolen, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, even though nothing had been done with the stolen
information to injure the plaintiffs.102 The District Court found the plaintiffs did not have standing
because “none of them had adequately alleged that the information was actually used to their
detriment,” therefore there was no injury-in-fact.103
In Circuit Judge Jordan’s opinion, the court analyzed the merit of the plaintiff’s argument
that the defendant caused an injury by “‘plac[ing] [them] at an imminent, immediate, and
continuing increased risk of harm from identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud. . . ’”104 In
making its determination, the Third Circuit first looked to historical precedent, and found there
was evidence that, “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”105
Within the Third Circuit, there were inconsistent interpretations of the sufficiency of a
statutory harm for conferring Article III standing.106 The Third Circuit reiterated their own

98

Id.
Id.
100
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 2017).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 634
104
Id. at 634 (quoting App. At 40.)
105
Id. at 635 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982).
106
In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 635.
99
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precedent, that, “[t]he proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered an
actual injury, not on whether a statute was violated.”107 This is contrary to many of the previous
district court decisions within the circuit, which had allowed statutory violations to constitute a
cognizable injury, without considering if there was an actual harm.108
To resolve the discrepancy within the Third Circuit, the Court looked to Spokeo.109 The
Circuit Court interpreted Spokeo to mean that “Congress ‘has the power to define injuries . . . that
were previously inadequate in law.’”110

Under this interpretation, legislatures can “elevate

intangible harms into concrete harms.”111
When applying Spokeo, the Third Circuit determined the facts of the current case did not
require the “consider[ation] [of] the full reach of congressional power to elevate a procedural
violation into an injury in fact” as “this case [did] not strain that reach.” 112 Instead, the court
determined that case law and common law allowed protection for the plaintiff’s right to privacy,
and that “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of information can itself constitute a
cognizable injury.”113 While the court conceded this alone may not have been sufficient to confer
Article III standing, “with the passage of the FCRA, Congress established that the unauthorized
dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself
. . .” and through its enactment of the FCRA, Congress had shown it “believed that the violation
of the FCRA causes a concrete harm to consumers.”114 The Third Circuit concluded the plaintiffs’

107

Id. at 635, n. 14.
Id. at 635.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 638.
111
Id.
112
In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638.
113
Id. at 638-39.
114
Id. at 639.
108
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had alleged a sufficient injury that was not a “mere technical or procedural violation of the FCRA,”
and remanded the plaintiffs’ case so it could proceed to litigation.115
c. Fourth Circuit
i. Dreher v. Experion Information Solutions
Dreher v. Experion Information Solutions stands out as a defendant friendly decision amongst
the consumer protection cases that have had standing analyzed with the Spokeo framework. While
Dreher was brought under the FCRA, it is significant for its analysis of the concrete and
particularized aspect of the alleged injury-in-fact.116
The controversy involved a 69,000-member class action, initiated by Dreher against
Experian.117 Dreher, in undergoing a background check for a security clearance with the federal
government found a delinquent credit card account on his credit report. 118 Dreher attempted to
contact the company associated with the card to fix the mistake.119 Not indicated on the credit
report was the fact that the company associated with the delinquent card had closed during the
2008 financial crisis.120 The portfolio of that company had been given to another company, and
was then assigned to CardWorks, Inc. and CardWorks Servicing L.L.C (collectively,
“Cardworks”).121 Experian chose not to change the name of the company on the plaintiffs’ credit
reports to comply with historic practices and to prevent consumer confusion.122 Dreher brought
the class action to federal court; he argued Experian’s failure to change the name of the company
listed on his credit report caused an informational injury.123

115

Id. at 640.
Dreher, 856 F.3d. at 340.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.at 341.
121
Id.
122
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 341.
123
Id. at 342.
116
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At trial, Experian argued the plaintiff lacked Article III standing.124 The District Court rejected
Experian’s argument, finding “the FCRA ‘creates a statutory right to receive the “sources of
information” for one’s credit report,’” which created an injury-in-fact sufficient to meet the burden
of establishing Article III standing.125 During the district court trial, Spokeo had not yet been
decided; therefore, the concrete and particularized requirements outlined in Spokeo were not
considered. 126
Because of the anticipated significance of Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit held Dreher in abeyance
until the decision was announced.127 Using Spokeo, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s
claim that he had suffered an injury-in-fact, “because he was denied ‘specific information to which
[he] w[as] entitled under the FCRA.”128 Using the Spokeo analysis, the court found the harm
claimed by the plaintiff was not concrete, and therefore, there was no Article III standing.129
The plaintiff attempted to establish concreteness by arguing the harm he suffered was “a ‘real’
harm with adverse effect.’”130 The Fourth Circuit rejected the contention, finding Dreher was
alleging a pure statutory violation, with very little injury to himself.131 The most significant injury
the plaintiff alleged was the fact that his security clearance with the federal government was
threatened by Experian’s failure to comply with the FCRA.132 The court found, however, that
while an actual harm to his security clearance would constitute an injury sufficient to establish
Article III standing, Dreher’s security clearance was not affected by Experian’s policy, meaning

124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 345.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 346.
132
Id.
125
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there was “no real world harm on Dreher.”133 Because the court found Dreher did not have an
injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.134
V.

Interpreting Modern TCPA Claims
In 1991, one of the leading harms Congress sought to prevent by enacting the TCPA was

abuse of consumers’ fax machines for unsolicited promotional purposes. 135 The abuse of this
practice led to usage of consumers’ tangible resources, including paper, ink, and toner, as well as
tying up landlines and being a general nuisance.136 The customers receiving promotional faxes
often had little control in the faxes being sent, and even if they were given the option to opt out, it
was not until after the advertiser had already used the consumer’s resources.137
Today, cell phones have changed the landscape of TCPA enforcement. Studies show that
where once having a home phone was a staple of American households, the trend today is for
people to disconnect their home phones and rely exclusively on cell phones.138 As more people
rely on cellphones, having access to consumers through their phone may cause increasingly
detrimental effects.139 If the proper regulations are not in place, advertisers can establish more
invasive telemarketing practices to access to consumers.140
Following Spokeo, most appellate courts have found a phone call constitutes a concrete and
particularized harm that can withstand scrutiny under the Spokeo standard.141 These findings are

133

Id.
Dreher, 856 F.3d at 347.
135
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 347.
136
Id. at 354.
137
Waller, Heidtke, & Stewart, supra note 2 at 357.
138
Id. at 384.
139
Id. at 387.
140
Waller, Heidtke & Stewart, supra note 2 at 387.
141
Bronstad, supra 9. See also, McLellan, supra 61 at 53.
134
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based on the idea that the violation of the statute demonstrates a concrete injury, and that an
invasion of privacy is a legally protected interest.142 An argument that supports this interpretation
is that, even with modern technology, the cost of advertising is shifted to the consumer.143 This
shifting in cost is especially detrimental to the twenty-three percent of all wireless subscribers who
have prepaid cellphone plans.144
Most courts uphold a plaintiff’s claim of harm under the TCPA under the justification that the
harm alleged is rooted in common law.145 As suggested in Spokeo, when the concrete and
particularized harm element is uncertain, it can be helpful to look to traditional English and
American law.146 The American common law has long recognized a right against “unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another”.147 Since the Congressional intent in enacting the TCPA
was in part to protect the privacy interests of consumers, the circuit courts have rationally
concluded that the harm is concrete and particularized, and thus sufficient to establish Article III
standing.148
Consumers can still be harmed if advertisers are allowed to send promotional text messages,
even with opt-out options.149 When consumer respond to a promotional text message to opt-out
of receiving future messages, the advertiser has confirmation they reached an active cell phone
number.150 These entities can then sell that information to others, putting consumers at risk for
continued privacy invasion.151
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Additionally, advertisers can include links that may lead consumers to accidently sign up for
services through the same messages offering the opt-out option.152 The prevalence of cellphone
use, as well as the savviness of advertisers, can put consumers at risk for prolonged and unwanted
invasions of privacy.
Though the TCPA was enacted to protect consumers from predatory businesses, today,
businesses themselves are at risk if the TCPA is too broadly interpreted. This is especially true for
small businesses, which often form marketing plans without knowledge of the extent of the TCPA
or the ramifications for violating the TCPA.153 Businesses are facing confusion as a result of
inconsistent enforcement of the TCPA.154 This is further complicated for the businesses operating
across state lines.

With varying interpretations of the TCPA amongst federal and state

jurisdictions, it can be difficult for companies to know if a marketing strategy will lead to a TCPA
violation.155 This inconsistency increases the likelihood a businesses will accidently violate the
TCPA. Under a broad interpretation of harm, these companies may be found liable, irrespective
of the business’ lack of intent. Congress’ goal in enacting the TCPA was to punish “malicious and
intentional violators,” therefore, businesses may be unduly harmed under the current trend of
interpretation.156
Additionally, a common payment plans consumers subscribe to for text messaging allows
them to send and receive unlimited messages for a fixed price. For a customer with this type of
plan, the customer pays the same amount for text messages, regardless of if it is a promotional
message. When consumers brought the initial TCPA claims in 1991, they were able to show a
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financial detriment in receiving an unwanted fax.157 For consumers today, receiving a text
message does not involve the same detriments the TCPA was enacted to prevent. The discrepancy
in the amount of harm demonstrated by the initial claims and claims filed today is rarely
considered, and should be further analyzed by the legislature and the FCC to determine if current
TCPA claims warrant the same degree of protection that was granted for consumers in 1991.
VI.

Is a Text Message an Injury?

As telecommunication technology has increased, courts have attempted to interpret legislation
that was enacted before the commonplace technology used today was in existence.158 The
prevalence of text messaging has led to businesses using it for marketing.159 As explained
previously, the TCPA has been interpreted to govern text messages.160 Because of this, claims are
beginning to arise under the TCPA from plaintiffs alleging promotional text messages from
companies amount to sufficient harm to confer Article III standing.161
When Spokeo was released, it was applied to a wide variety of consumer litigation claims,
including TCPA claims, to aid courts in determining if the injuries alleged were sufficient to
support Article III standing.162 After the Susinno decision held a single unsolicited phone call was
sufficient to confer Article III standing, it was an opinion of legal scholar, Amanda Bronstad, that
the TCPA was being interpreted in a consumer friendly fashion, with a decidedly broad
interpretation of what could constitute harm.163
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As previously noted, text messaging has taken up prominence in today’s society.

For

businesses, it is an efficient and inexpensive method to market products and services, and has the
ability to reach a large population over various demographics. For consumers however, receiving
text messages from businesses can feel like an invasion, and alongside being a nuisance, can lead
to accidental purchases if companies send misleading promotions.
As of now, one case alleging an injury by way of text message has made it to the Circuit Court
level.164 While that case found the text message was not sufficient to confer an injury, an analysis
of similar cases presents an argument that other courts would find a text message a sufficient injury
to confer Article III standing.165 Because of the influence text messaging has on today’s society,
it is imperative to consider because (1) businesses should be aware of the extent they can use text
messages as a promotional devise; (2) consumers who are truly being harmed by a business’s
promotional tactics should be able to find recourse; and (3) consumers should be made aware of
their rights so businesses cannot evade liability just because the injury is relatively minor.
Additionally, it is important for a consensus by the higher federal courts as text messaging can
and often does allow a business to reach consumers across a wide range of jurisdictions.
Consistency in judicial interpretation will allow companies to better comply their practices to the
law.
a. Spokeo Analysis
The Spokeo analysis has been important for determining the injury requirement of
consumer protection claims, and is therefore important for determining if a text message is a
sufficient injury for TCPA claims. Courts utilizing Spokeo have used it to determine if injuries
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alleged by plaintiffs are “concrete and particularized.”166 Justice Alito defined a particularized
injury as one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”167 The Court defines
a “concrete” injury as one that is real as opposed to abstract.168 The opinion in Spokeo specifically
differentiates these two terms and requires that both be met to confer standing. 169 Without an
“appreciat[ion] [for] the distinction between concreteness and particularization,” a court’s standing
analysis is incomplete. 170
i. Concreteness
Using the Spokeo analysis, a single unsolicited text message from a business can constitute
a concrete injury. An injury is concrete if, “it [] actually exist[s],” or is de facto.171 In Spokeo, the
Court specifically states that being “tangible” is not a requirement for a concrete injury172
In analyzing if an intangible harm would constitute a concrete injury, Justice Alito points
to an analysis of “history and the judgment of Congress” to aid in the analysis.173 Historical
practices are useful, as an “intangible harm [that] has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English and American courts,” is
more likely to constitute a sufficient concrete injury against a plaintiff.174 Legislative Acts are
important because (1) the legislature is in a “position[] to identify intangible harms that meet
minimum Article III requirements and (2) “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate at law.”175 Though
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a legislative act may be indicative of a concrete injury, it is not conclusive.176 It would not be
considered sufficient for a plaintiff to allege a “mere procedural violation, divorced from any
concrete harm . . . .”177
In Sussino, the court summarized that an injury is concrete when the plaintiff “sues under
a statute alleging ‘the very injury [the statute] is intended to prevent,’ and the injury ‘has a close
relationship to a harm . . . traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts . . . .”178 When applying this to the plaintiff’s claim regarding a single phone call from the
defendant, the court noted that (1) Congress had identified the injury and it was the very injury
Congress was attempting to protect plaintiffs from, and (2) “TCPA claims closely relate to
traditional claims for ‘invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance [which] have
long been heard by American courts.’”179 It was based on this analysis the court found the plaintiff
had alleged a concrete injury.180
Based on the Spokeo analysis and the subsequent analysis of “concreteness” in the circuit
cases that followed, it seems likely that sending an unsolicited text message constitutes a concrete
injury. The TCPA has been construed to apply to text messages.181 The intent of Congress in
enacting the TCPA was to “protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by
placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls . . . .”182 Protection of a consumer’s
privacy by businesses wanting to send unsolicited promotional text messages would fit into the
legislative intent.
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Additionally, as referenced in Susinno, TCPA claims are rooted in the common law
protection of privacy, intrusion of seclusion, and nuisance.183 Based on both the legislation’s aim
to protect the consumer’s privacy interest as well as the common law’s interest in protecting similar
interests, an unsolicited text message would constitute a harm to a plaintiff.
ii. Particularized
If a plaintiff were to receive a text message and file suit in response to that text message, it
would constitute a particularized injury. A particularized injury is one that effects the plaintiff as
an individual.184 The plaintiff argued in Spokeo that the defendant had “violated his statutory
rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and that his, “interests . . . [were] individualized
rather than collective.”185
If a plaintiff is filing suit in response to receiving a text message, then that person’s statutory
rights under the TCPA have been allegedly violated. This is sufficient to confer a particularized
injury.
Conclusion
While it may seem outlandish given the proclivity of text messages and the lack of significant
harm, the law as it stands today, when considering both the TCPA and Spokeo, allows plaintiffs to
sue for the receipt of an unsolicited text message.
While general standing may be conferred, other issues should factor into the allowance of
litigation on the grounds of a text message, such as prudential standing and implied consent by
consumers. There should also be a consideration of the logic in allowing such litigation to
commence on the basis of the TCPA. When the TCPA was enacted, consumers were facing abuses
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by businesses that resulted in a nuisance, a waste of consumer’s resources, and potential inability
of consumers to use their fax machines. In comparison, the detriment of receiving a text message
is arguably minor. Consumers are often able to block numbers they no longer wish to receive calls
or messages from. Additionally, single text messages are inexpensive, and for many, come as part
of a plan that makes it so the consumer does not spend additional money for receipt of that
message. Further, when a text message is received, it seems unlikely that the phone will be unable
to function as the consumer wishes it to for any significant amount of time.
That being said, it is well recognized that consumers have a right to privacy and the U.S. legal
system has recognized that right as telecommunication technologies have advanced. While
technology was once limited in location, today, cell phones allow consumers to have their mobile
devices almost anywhere, making it so messaging from an unsolicited caller is arguably more
intrusive than ever before. Additionally, given the wide variety of cellphone plans offered, many
consumers still face a financial burden, especially if businesses malicious and abusive promotional
strategies.
Ultimately, businesses should be able to formulate a clear marketing plan, without fear of
inadvertently intruding on the rights of consumers, and consumers should have the right to protect
their privacy. As it stands, the TCPA is outdated. When the TCPA was enacted in 1991, text
messaging was not yet in existence, but today accounts for a substantial part of many people’s
lives. Even given its importance, Congress has yet to pass specific legislation to address the duties
and rights of businesses and consumers in regards to promotional text messages.
To better accommodate both businesses and consumer’s interests, new legislation should be
considered to address the role of text messages in advertising. By conducting their own research
and considering the voice of the people, Congress is in the best position to determine when there
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should be standing for a single text message. Until then, under Spokeo, plaintiffs will be injured
by receiving a text message.
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